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We contest publication of Marino et al. (2019) regarding captive killer whale (Orcinus orca) welfare because of misrepresentations of 
available data and the use of citations that do not support assertions. Marino et al. misrepresent stress response concepts and erroneously 
cite studies, which appear to support Marino et al.’s philosophical beliefs regarding the cetacean hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis. 
To be clear, these misrepresentations are not differences of scientific opinion, as the authors’ conclusions lack any scientific basis. More 
extensive review of Marino et al.’s citations reveal a dearth of empirical evidence to support their assertions. Further, Marino et al.’s 
approach to animal welfare is not consistent with conventional veterinary approaches to animal welfare, including their apparent 
opposition to the use of preventative and therapeutic veterinary interventions. While Marino et al. argue that killer whales’ cognitive 
and spatial needs preclude management of this species under human care, misrepresentation of the citations used to support this opinion 
invalidates their arguments. Misleading interpretations of data relative to killer whales’ cognitive and emotional needs, as well as 
specious and unsubstantiated comparisons with states experienced by humans with posttraumatic stress disorder and other conditions, 
represent a number of strategies used to misrepresent knowledge regarding killer whale welfare. These misrepresentations and fallacies 
are inconsistent with scientific ethical standards for credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018) and are barriers to rigorous 
discourse and identification of strategies for optimizing killer whale welfare. Assertions in the paper amount to nothing more than a 
compilation of conclusory, philosophical statements. We would also like to mention that manuscripts such as Marino et al.’s do great 
damage to the fields of comparative psychology and to behavioral science as a whole. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper contests Marino et al. (2019) regarding the welfare of killer whales1 (Orcinus orca) under 
human care. The focus of this paper is the misrepresentation of available data and promotion of fallacies in 
Marino et al. These misrepresentations and fallacies are inconsistent with scientific ethical standards for 
credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018; https://www.elsevier.com/authors/journal-authors/policies-
and-ethics). These misrepresentations and fallacies are barriers to rigorous discourse and identification of 
 
1 Note that we will use the term “killer whale” because it is used in common convention, except where the term “orca” is used as part 
of a quote. 
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strategies for optimizing killer whale welfare. Full consideration of the philosophical basis for Marino et al.’s  
beliefs and discussion of differences of opinion require separate forums. 
 
Marino et al. (2019) is incorrectly presented as a balanced review. In fact, Marino et al. is more an 
editorial that presents selected information out of context in support of the beliefs stated in the title and text of 
the paper (Overall, 2018, 2019). Beliefs supported by credible data and the need to use data for the betterment 
of animal welfare are important points because science and medicine have advanced when minds have been 
open to understanding the difference between beliefs and whether or not there is evidence supporting these 
beliefs; beliefs are not equivalent to scientific knowledge (Overall, 2019). Beliefs and hypotheses are often 
wrong, even when based on reasonable principles (Evans, 2012). 
 
The core question posed by Marino et al.’s (2019) manuscript is whether there are data to support the 
belief that killer whales and other cetaceans differ from other species with high cognitive abilities to such a 
great extent that humans are unable to care for their needs. In this paper, we provide evidence that multiple 
misrepresentations and fallacies exist in Marino et al. Based on a thorough examination of the data presented 
by Marino et al., we conclude that there is currently no support for the posed belief that humans cannot meet 
killer whale needs. 
 
Fallacies in Marino et al.’s (2019) Argument That Killer Whales Under Human Care Suffer from 
Chronic Stress 
 
The central message of Marino et al. (2019) is that killer whales under human care suffer from chronic 
stress. There are two core issues that undermine Marino et al.’s central assertion. First, the authors focus on 
distress or maladaptive stress under the generic term “stress,” while blurring the distinction between stressors 
and acute and chronic stress responses. This misrepresentation could be due to a misunderstanding of the 
concepts or an imprecise use of terminology. For example, Marino et al. refers to “maladaptive stressors” (p. 
13), rather than recognizing that a maladaption can only occur in the stress response, and should therefore not 
be referred to as a type of stressor (Bautista & Burggren, 2019; Felder et al., 2018; Homberg et al., 2017; Parker 
et al., 2017). Whether this misrepresentation is due to a misunderstanding of the concepts, conscious omission, 
or other reasons is uncertain. Regardless, this misrepresentation evidences a misunderstanding of the 
established scientific understanding of the stress response, including references cited by Marino et al. (e.g., 
Lupien et al., 2009; Selye, 1976; see our Appendix). We also note that one of Marino et al.’s most frequently 
cited sources (McEwen and colleagues) considers “stress” to be an imprecise term (McEwae, 2000) and that 
McEwan’s papers (see Appendix 1) clearly define the concepts that McEwan and colleagues present. Marino 
et al.’s blurring and misrepresentation of concepts confounds clear evaluation of their central assertion. 
 
Second, a core misconception advanced by Marino et al. (2019) is that “orcas and other 
cetaceans…adhere to the classic HPA2 model” (p. 13). In actuality, Marino et al. selectively interpret these 
references and fail to acknowledge that Marino et al.’s core references (cf. Atkinson et al., 2015; Atkinson & 
Dierauf, 2018) present information that is inconsistent with Marino et al.’s ) statement. For instance, the title 
of Table 2 in Atkinson et al. (2015) is “Differences between marine and terrestrial species in their stress 
responses” (p. 471). 
 
Other examples in Atkinson et al. (2015) that Marino et al. (2019) do not acknowledge include 
passages where Atkinson et al. (2015) stated that marine mammal "mediator activity … diverges from 
generalized terrestrial models," (abstract, p. 477), and where it is stated that “marine mammals seem to diverge 
from the terrestrial mammal norm in the complexity of regulatory systems that increase activity under 
perceived or physical stressors” (Atkinson et al., p. 477). Further undermining Marino et al.’s efforts to apply 
the “classic HPA model” to killer whales is in the conclusion of Atkinson’s second paper, which states that “the 
stress response…. (is a) term (that) is too often applied indiscriminately as a convenient ‘catchall’ when efforts 
 
2 Hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis 
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to reach some other diagnosis fall short” (Atkinson & Dierauf, 2018, p. 10). 
 
This caution is repeated elsewhere among Marino et al.’s (2019) references, where it is stated that “a 
recent review (Atkinson et al., 2015) warned that terrestrial animal stress models might not always be 
applicable to marine mammals, and these authors presented evidence to suggest that neuroendocrine hormones 
may be regulated very differently in cetaceans” (Clegg & Butterworth, 2017, p. 196). Marino et al.’s assertions 
about the cetacean HPA also misused citations about acute stress in cetaceans (Fair et al., 2014; Thomson & 
Geraci, 1986) when discussing chronic stress, thereby conflating two very different concepts and 
misrepresenting the available empirical evidence. The remaining references cited by Marino et al. in support 
of their misstatement that cetaceans adhere to the classic HPA model (Houser et al., 2011; Levin, 2018; Romano 
et al., 2002) do not present data on chronic stress in cetaceans. Marino et al.’s citations do not support their 
statement regarding the cetacean HPA, and this misrepresentation of the citations is not consistent with 
scientific ethical standards. 
 
The extensive mention of stress and publication title of Marino et al. (2019) are not accompanied by 
rigorous support for the authors’ thesis. The use of the term “stress” in this paper reflects common use of the 
term as a negative affective state, although the origin of the term (in Marino et al.’s Selye [1976] reference) 
recognizes that all living beings are exposed to various stressors, some of which result in “good” (eustress) 
stress responses and some of which result in “bad” (distress) stress responses. Given Marino et al.’s discussion, 
we will interpret their use of the word stress as meaning distress unless otherwise stated in the text.  
 
A survey of use of the word stress or stressors in Marino et al.’s (2019) text results in 79 mentions of 
stress and stressors over 19 pages of text, not including the title or headers, and 48 citations associated with 
these uses of stress and/or stressors (Appendix 1). Of these citations, only four present original data concerned 
with killer whales under human care, including two case reports of fungal infections in a single citation 
(Reidarson et al., 2018), a legal document developed by one of their co-authors regarding a single killer whale 
at a single facility (Visser, 2016), and a second unpublished, non-peer-reviewed self-citation of a killer whale 
at another facility (Visser & Lisker, 2016). 
 
As addressed more fully later, these case reports and self-citations are insufficient to support this 
manuscript’s assertions. While the data on other cetaceans could be relevant to killer whales, there are species 
differences, including Marino et al.’s (2019) failure to recognize that the smaller dolphin species and killer 
whales have different social structures (“open” and “closed”, respectively) that limit cross-taxonomic 
inferences regarding responses to stressors (Simmonds, 2006). Therefore, Marino et al.’s (2019) merging of 
acute stress responses in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) (Fair et al., 2014; Thomson & Geraci, 1986) 
with speculation on chronic stress in killer whales represents a substantial conceptual deficiency and 
misrepresentation of the available data. 
 
Similarly, associating chronic stress in cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus) (Terio et al., 2004) with 
speculation on killer whales is a specious argument that has limited relevance when it is considered that 
findings in cheetahs do not appear to be generally applicable to even other Felidae species that are closer 
taxonomic relatives to the cheetah than are killer whales. (See also Simmonds (2006) for caution when directly 
comparing terrestrial and aquatic species.) A review of the references also reveals many misrepresentations 
and false statements in Marino et al.’s (2019) text, as listed in Appendix 1, and discussed later in this document. 
These concerns are not minimized by associating speculation on killer whale affective states, in the absence of 
corresponding and converging behavioral or functional brain data, with citations concerned with the experience 
of human prisoners of war and others experiencing depression (Aloni et al., 2018; Başoğlu, 2009; Lupien et 
al., 2009) or the biochemical and neuroanatomical changes in laboratory rodents that are completely 
immobilized or deprived of food and water (Bennur et al., 2007; Vyas et al., 2002). These misleading 
generalizations and false analogies are not consistent with the transparent expectations of peer-reviewed 
journals (ICMJE, 2018). 
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Marino et al.’s (2019) statements of causality based on correlational evidence also fail to meet 
expectations for transparency in peer-reviewed scientific literature. One example of many is the statement that 
“[t]he confinement of naturally wide-ranging mammals causes chronic stress (Dawkins, 1998) . . .” (p. 16). A 
second example is, “For example, Clubb and Mason (2003, 2007) found that natural home-range size predicted 
captive infant mortality and stereotypic pacing behavior in carnivores, and that captive environments cause the 
most stress to naturally wide-ranging species by preventing species-typical behavior” (p. 16).  The cited studies 
are observational and therefore can only be used to establish correlation. Misuse of the word “cause” in these 
instances instead of “correlation” is a gross misrepresentation of the available data, minimally, especially 
without a full discussion of the limitations of these studies. This is a basic principle of the scientific method 
and it was misused in Marino et al. 
 
Animal Welfare Assessment  
 
Animal welfare can be assessed using principles that optimize the safety and well-being of animals 
within the context of existing and potential tradeoffs (Miller, Anthony, & Golab, 2018). The beliefs expressed 
by Marino et al. (2019) are inconsistent with the American Veterinary Medical Association’s (AVMA, 2019) 
animal welfare principles, which include responsible use of animals for human purposes; making decisions 
about animal care, use, and welfare by balancing scientific knowledge and professional judgment; providing 
access to good health care; minimizing pain, fear, stress, and suffering; continuously evaluating current 
practices; focusing on conserving and managing the population ethically; treating animals with respect and 
dignity from beginning to end of life; and continually improving animal health and welfare through science, 
advocacy, and legislation (AVMA, 2019).  
 
Rather than discussing approaches to optimize animal welfare, even to form a basis for comparison, 
Marino et al. (2019) chose to present what can be more accurately characterized as an opinion piece that 
optimized emotion and belief manipulation rather than an objective review of the data or analytical reasoning. 
This biased approach does not benefit the development of strategies for optimizing animal welfare. Publication 
of an opinion piece under the guise of scientific research and failure to acknowledge or discuss established 
veterinary professional animal welfare principles are not consistent with the important practice of 
distinguishing between belief and knowledge, doing good, advancing discourse on established principles, 
following the scientific process, or benefiting animal welfare.    
 
Are Killer Whales Different? 
 
The Journal of Veterinary Behavior (JVB) has published manuscripts on the behavior, welfare, and 
strategies for improving the welfare of species such as Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in aquaculture (King, 
2009), working therapy dogs studied in outpatient hospital settings (Clark et al., 2019), pet gray parrots 
(Psittacus erithacus; Greenwell & Montrose, 2017), cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus), tigers (Panthera tigris, 
Phillips et al., 2017), snakes (Warwick et al., 2019), and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla; Fuller & Allard, 2018) 
under different management systems. Thus, while the JVB publication of manuscripts about nondomestic 
animals is not unusual, opposition to human management of a species without clinical applications or research 
that improves animal welfare appears to be atypical. Philosophical opposition to any species under human care 
is a valid topic of discussion if explicitly and transparently addressed with rigor. In contrast, Marino et al. 
(2019) appear to be using a comparative approach to argue that killer whales are intrinsically unsuited to be 
held under human care. Thus, while Marino et al. propose that killer whales “possess the neurobiological 
foundations of complex psychology, emotion, and behavior,” there is uncertainty as to how killer whales differ 
from other species discussed in the JVB manuscripts or whether Marino et al.’s underlying argument is that no 
species should be in human care. 
 
Marino et al. (2019) used a selective comparative approach to argue that the neuroanatomy of killer 
whales enables them to have uniquely complex cognitive capabilities. The inaccuracies of Marino et al.’s 
assertions are highlighted by examining four points: 
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1. Marino et al. (2019) state that killer whale brains have been “described as being more corticalized than the 
human brain” (p. 3) without linking how corticalization results in compromised animal welfare when under 
human care. Marino et al.’s neuroanatomical specialness assertion also fails to acknowledge alternate 
hypotheses, such as was presented in the Wright et al. (2017) paper cited by Marino et al. The alternate 
hypothesis presented by Wright et al. proposed that delphinoid cetaceans (as a group) may have “divergent 
cerebral morphology … in response to the sensorimotor demands of the aquatic environment,” (p. 417) 
rather than the “high-level cognitive and social functions” (p. 3) that Marino et al. present. Moreover, a 
broader comparative approach indicates that Marino et al.’s link between brain structure and function has 
limitations. This conclusion is based on species without comparable neocortical structure that are capable 
of cognitive tasks that are comparable and possibly superior to primates, such as corvids and psittacines 
(Emery, 2006), and species such as cephalopods that are capable of complex cognition in the absence of 
comparable brain structure (Mather & Dickel, 2017). We will not digress into how cognition is defined, 
but there are variable parameters for this term (Willemet, 2013).  
 
2. Marino et al. (2019) stated that “recent work on orcas has shown that “limbic functions” are well integrated 
with other cortical functions” as an argument for the species’ advanced emotional and cognitive capabilities 
(p. 4). This unsupported assertion assumes that killer whale cortical functions are fully inferred from 
neuroanatomy and does not consider differences between cetaceans and other species. Of more substantive 
concern is that Marino et al.’s (2019) three supporting citations (Marino et al., 2004; Morgane et al., 2005; 
Pessoa & Hof, 2015) consist of two citations that do not mention killer whales and a self-citation that was 
limited in scope to gross morphology (as recognized in Wright et al., 2017) and did not present data on 
killer whale’s emotional and cognitive processes. 
 
3. Marino et al. (2019) also use a self-citation to suggest that relative brain size is a predictor of cognitive 
capacity across species (Marino et al., 2004). However, Marino’s assertion is oversimplified and not 
universally supported (Herculano-Houzel, 2011; Willemet, 2013).  
 
4. Marino et al. (2019) links chronic stress to killer whale brain cell shrinkage. However, descriptions of CA3 
neurons and steroid hormone receptors in the brains of cetaceans are not cited by Marino et al. and do not 
appear to be documented in peer-reviewed scientific literature. Thus, this line of reasoning is simply 
speculative and should have been represented as such rather than as fact. 
 
In total, Marino et al.’s (2019) assertion that killer whales have unique capabilities based on 
neuroanatomy represent inaccurate presentations of peer-reviewed, published literature. Similarly, other 
citations used by Marino et al. concerned with biochemical mechanisms and neuroanatomy did not establish a 
relationship between the citations’ findings and killer whales, or how killer whales might be suffering from 
chronic distress and be uniquely unsuited to thrive under human care. Rather, the use of citations obscured the 
discourse by providing misleading information about concerns that deserve to be soberly considered, and failed 
to provide any direct empirical support or acknowledge information that is inconsistent with Marino et al.’s 
beliefs. As indicated above for other topics, these misrepresentations and fallacies are inconsistent with 
scientific ethical standards for credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018). 
 
Are Killer Whales’ Physical Needs Met Under Human Care? 
 
A basic question for all animals under human care is whether their physical needs are met. One way 
that this can be considered is by examining health issues on a population-level and individual-animal basis. 
However, Marino et al.’s (2019) section on causes of illness and death suffers from the fallacious, implicit 
assertion that the existence of disease represents poor husbandry and poor welfare. In fact, as clinicians 
generally understand for all species, including humans, disease occurs in living organisms. The infectious 
diseases listed by Marino et al. are not restricted to killer whales; moreover, Marino et al. neglected to 
acknowledge that bacterial, viral, and fungal infectious diseases also occur in free-ranging killer whales 
(Goldman et al., 2011; LaMere et al., 2009; Raverty et al., 2017). 
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The impact of infectious and noninfectious disease on individuals and populations is the key 
consideration for placing the occurrence of disease for killer whales in context. For instance, while Marino et 
al. (2019) associates gastric ulceration with Helicobacter pylori infections using a 1994 citation concerned 
with humans (Nomura et al., 1994), this assertion ignores research over the last quarter century that indicates 
that Helicobacter spp. can be a commensal organism in humans (Li & Perez-Perez, 2018) and other species 
(Terio et al., 2005; Yasuda et al., 2015) and that both captive and wild healthy cetaceans harbor Helicobacter 
spp. (Goldman et al., 2011). Thus, in contrast to Marino et al.’s assertion, the presence of Helicobacter spp. in 
cetaceans and other species is not a valid indicator of disease, “prolonged stress” (Marino et al., p. 8), or 
compromised animal welfare; Marino et al.’s assertion should not be accepted by a legitimate peer-reviewed 
medical journal such as JVB. 
 
The JVB’s acceptance of summaries of diseases in killer whales without context and as a proxy for 
chronic stress is puzzling. Similarly, the JVB’s implicit acceptance that veterinary care of killer whales is a 
source or consequence of maladaptive stress is unfortunate for a veterinary journal. The detailed descriptions 
of veterinary (including dental) treatments and discussion of the potential for adverse effects from therapy 
appear to suggest that provision of veterinary care for killer whales is problematic. 
 
As free-ranging killer whales also have dental, infectious, and noninfectious disease, rigorous data are 
needed to establish that the conditions listed by Marino et al. (2019) represent untenable consequences or 
causes of chronic stress in killer whales under human care. Marino et al. also failed to note that killer whales 
in human care voluntarily cooperate with their medical care, which is a strategy that reduces distress in killer 
whales and other marine mammals and improves the number of viable options for providing quality veterinary 
care (Brando et al., 2018; Lacave, 2018). 
 
Given that animals under human care deserve to receive management and veterinary care that optimize 
their welfare, there is a need for the JVB to clarify why killer whales are not deserving of veterinary services, 
as seems to be put forth by Marino et al. (2019). We also note that veterinary care of captive killer whales is 
the basis for provision of veterinary services to free-ranging killer whales with medical concerns, such as well-
publicized interventions proposed and enacted for Southern Resident killer whales (Gaydos et al., 2019; Shore, 
2018). As anthropogenic stressors increase in extent and magnitude, this veterinary medical expertise will 
likely become more critical for free-ranging killer whales. This approach is similar to what has been recognized 
for terrestrial wildlife that are inhabiting increasingly restricted “natural” areas (Deem, 2007). 
 
Nutrition is another key component of meeting the physical needs of killer whales under human care. 
Marino et al.’s (2019) use of the word “dead” when referring to fish and squid fed to killer whales under human 
care seems to suggest that conventional feeding practices are flawed. If this is Marino et al.’s intent, it fails to 
acknowledge the feeding of restaurant-quality fish, assessment, and quality control of fish nutritional quality, 
regulatory oversight, and other strategies used to address the nutritional needs of killer whales and other marine 
mammals under human care (Brando et al, 2018; Crissey & Spencer, 1998; Rosen & Worthy, 2018). Of 
relevance to animal welfare is that freezing fish also kills parasites that could infest killer whales, in contrast 
to parasite transmission that occurs with consuming live prey in wild marine mammal populations (Rosen & 
Worthy, 2018). Feeding live fish to killer whales under human care is an alternate strategy, although this 
presents animal welfare concerns for the fish and illustrates the tradeoffs and biases that are inherent in 
assessing and optimizing animal welfare for all species (Miller, Anthony, & Golab, 2018). This is yet another 
example of an opinion set forth by Marino et al. without any discussion of established principles and current 
practices. 
 
An underlying concern for meeting killer whale physical needs is Marino et al.’s (2019) thesis that 
killer whales under human care have insufficient space and that this causes chronic stress. For instance, on 
page 16 of Marino et al., there is a section devoted to “The Stress of Confinement” and “the negative impacts 
of enclosure size (as) related to the natural history of a species.” This section cites Morgan and Tromborg’s 
(2007) dolphin studies as support for this assertion. However, besides limitations regarding extrapolations from 
smaller dolphins to killer whales (as indicated above) and contrary to Marino et al.’s assertion, Morgan and 
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Tromborg (2007) state that some species “do not always prefer the largest available living spaces,” (p. 278) 
and cite Shyan et al. (2002) when stating that "dolphins given a choice between three pool sizes choose to 
spend most of their time in moderate-sized areas, rather than the largest area available" (p. 278).  
Misrepresentation of Morgan and Tromborg’s publication is not consistent with scientific ethics and confounds 
serious consideration of Marino et al.’s discussion of enclosure size.  
 
Are Killer Whales’ Cognitive and Emotional Needs Met?  
 
 As described above, the discussion of killer whale cognitive and emotional needs suffers from the 
overinterpretation of available evidence, speculation when data are not available, and distortions of the current 
knowledge. Drawing conclusions about the potential function of various brain regions based on comparative 
neuroanatomical evidence represents an overgeneralization and is misleading to readers less familiar with this 
literature. Currently, there is no behavioral or functional imaging validation of Marino et al.’s (2019) proposed 
functions associated with cetacean neuroanatomy. Thus, it is speculative for Marino et al. to state that "the 
expansion of these areas in cetaceans is arguably associated with high-level cognitive and social functions such 
as attention, prediction, social awareness and empathy. . ." (p. 3). 
 
Moreover, as previously indicated, Marino et al.’s (2019) assertions are misleading by failing to 
acknowledge a competing hypothesis that cetacean paralimbic cortex anatomy is an adaptation for meeting the 
sensorimotor demands of the aquatic environment (Wright et al., 2017). Furthermore, Marino et al.’s 
incomplete discussion of self-awareness as the basis for killer whales having unique cognitive qualities does 
not acknowledge that contingency checking is found in many species that never pass the mark test (Anderson 
& Gallup, 2015; Clary & Kelly, 2016). In fact, there is evidence that a fish species (cleaner wrasse, Labroides 
dimidiatus) shows both contingency checking and passes the mark test (Kohda et al., 2019), in contrast to 
Marino et al.’s suggestion that self-recognition is a special cognitive ability of killer whales. 
 
In addition, Marino et al.’s (2019) use of words that are anthropomorphic, such as referring to offspring 
as “children” (p. 7), is inconsistent with presenting an objective scientific discussion. Unfortunately, failure to 
acknowledge strong evidence that counters Marino et al.’s beliefs, in combination with terminology that is not 
consistent with scientific expectations, precludes rigorous discussion of killer whale cognition and affective 
states. Moreover, to objectively evaluate the welfare concerns of killer whales in human care, a balanced 
discussion requires acknowledgement of current best practices to manage cetaceans in compatible social 
groups, an understanding of how human interactions serve to address cetacean’s social needs, and a knowledge 
of various management practices to provide cetaceans with mental stimulation. While omission and use of 
terms intended to evoke emotion may be used to sway public opinion, the use of this persuasive technique is 
inconsistent with scientific ethical standards for credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018). 
 
Strategies Used to Misrepresent Knowledge Regarding Killer Whale Welfare 
 
 The three general categories of information presented in Marino et al. (2019) are: A) general 
information about the General Adaptation Syndrome, B) selective interpretations of cetacean characteristics, 
and C) hypothesized equivalence between killer whales and the biological and behavioral mechanisms of 
humans, rodents, carnivores, and other species without providing compelling links to killer whale affective 
states. These three categories of information represent a series of statements of why things may be, which are 
substituted for arguments as to how things are. The length of Marino et al.’s text, numerous references, and the 
variety of topics presented does not change the fact that their statement is an unsupported hypothesis based on 
erroneous assertions. 
 
The errors presented in Marino et al. (2019), as documented above and in Appendix 1, represent a 
number of recognizable misrepresentations of killer whale affective states that are based on what appear to be 
philosophical beliefs. Given the publicity that killer whales and other cetaceans receive and the impact of 
misrepresentations on the welfare of cetaceans under human care and in the wild, we will briefly summarize 
(in Table 1) some of the types of fallacies that Marino et al. used to support their assertions misrepresented as 
8 
 
scientific discourse. While full discussion of such strategies in societal discourse is beyond the scope of this 
document, there is a need to highlight such strategies when they sully scientific communications. 
Disagreements and debate of ideas are a part of accepted scientific discourse, but the failure (intentionally or 
unintentionally) to adhere to ethical norms is not acceptable (ICMJE, 2018). 
 
Table 1 lists a variety of misrepresentations that Marino et al. (2019) used to distract readers from the 
core points that the authors presented with the effect of minimizing rigorous analysis. These misrepresentations 
are not comprehensive and are not mutually exclusive, such as the example of omission of a quarter of a century 
of data on Helicobacter spp. also having the effect of evoking emotional concern about gastric ulceration. 
 
Table 1 
A Partial List of Misrepresentations Evident in Marino et al. (2019) with Selected Examples  
Type of 
Misrepresentation Selected Examples [Page Number in Marino et al. (2019) in Brackets] 
Fabrication • Marino et al. stated that “regularly prescribed prophylactic antibiotics 
prior to even minor repair work in the stadium adjoining her tank” (p. 
17) occurred for a single killer whale at a single facility, based on an 
unpublished self-citation (Visser, 2016). The Visser (2016) self-citation 
had a single mention of a whale stadium repair, and no antibiotics 
appear to be listed in the document. (See Appendix 1 for more 
information.) 
Distortion • Marino et al. stated that cetaceans “adhere to the classic HPA model” 
(p. 13) while the cited references state otherwise (for a full discussion, 
see the above section: Fallacies in Marino et al.’s argument that orca 
under human care suffer from chronic stress). 
• Marino et al. misused a citation on use of novel objects for 
environmental enrichment (Sambrook & Buchanan-Smith, 1997) to 
support a statement that “one of the greatest stressors in the lives of 
captive animals is their inability to control most aspects of their 
surroundings and lives” (p. 17). Sambrook and Buchanan-Smith (1997) 
did not use the word stressor, and “stress” is only included in Sambrook 
and Buchanan-Smith’s list of citations.  
• Marino et al. state that “The expansion of these areas in cetaceans is 
arguably associated with high-level cognitive and social functions such 
as attention, prediction, social awareness and empathy” (p. 3). Neither 
citation used supports this statement. One of the citations used (Allman 
et al., 2005) is concerned with autism in humans. The second paper 
(Hof et al., 2005) is a self-citation, in which the words “attention,” 
“prediction,” “social awareness,” or “empathy” do not appear with an 
electronic search of the text.  
Omission • Marino et al. state that “Gastric ulceration is often caused by prolonged 
stress, as well as being associated with the bacterium Helicobacter 
pylori (Nomura et al., 1994)” (p. 8). However, Marino et al. failed to 
cite the extensive number of Helicobacter-related publications 
subsequent to Nomura et al. (1994) indicating that the organism is 
generally a commensal (nonpathogenic) and that it is also found in 
healthy free-ranging cetaceans (for more information see above section: 
Are killer whales’ physical needs met under human care?). 
Cherry picking1 • Marino et al.’s section on self-awareness (p. 5) does not acknowledge 
that contingency checking is found in many species that never pass the 
mark test (Anderson & Gallup, 2015; Clary & Kelly, 2016), and that a 
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fish species (cleaner wrasse, Labroides dimidiatus) shows both 
contingency checking and passes the mark test (Kohda et al., 2019). 
Misleading vividness2 • Use of terms such as “commercial trade” (p. 2), “concrete tanks” (pp. 1-
3, 10, 14-19), and “tricks” (rather than trained behaviors for husbandry 
or enrichment purposes) (p. 18), “dead fish” (p. 11), and dental pulps 
that are “necrotic, infected, or hyperplastic” (p. 11), are intended to 
evoke negative emotional connotations.  
• Referring to killer whale offspring as children (p. 7) invokes a human-
based association instead of remaining objective. This contrasts with 
previous JVB publications, in which production swine are housed in 
“individual crates” (Oelke et al., 2018), Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) 
in “transport systems” for aquaculture (King, 2009), and working 
therapy dogs studied in outpatient hospital settings (Clark et al., 2019). 
Similarly, nondomestic animals kept as pets or for exhibition were 
housed in cages (pet gray parrots, Psittacus erithacus; Greenwell & 
Montrose, 2017), cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus) and tigers (Panthera 
tigris) were kept in enclosures (Phillips et al., 2017), snakes in 
enclosures or viveria (Warwick et al., 2019), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla 
gorilla) in indoor habitats (Fuller & Allard, 2018), and dolphins 
(Tursiops truncatus) housed in open and closed facilities (Ugaz et al., 
2013). 
Snow job3 • Extensive discussion of encephalization, cerebral expansion, limbic 
system, sensory regulation, self-awareness, emotion, and other 
information (pp. 2-6) that does not specifically address the question of 
whether killer whale experience chronic distress that compromises their 
welfare. 
• Linking of killer whale welfare and killer whale attacks on humans (pp. 
10, 33, 34) when they are distinct issues. 
Draw your own 
conclusion/jumping to 
conclusions fallacy4 
• Marino et al.’s extensive list of medical and dental diseases (pp. 8-11) 
with descriptions of treatments that may be intended to evoke negative 
connotations. This contrasts with the context and consideration of how 
medical and dental care is viewed for humans and other species, as well 
as for untreated disease in free-ranging killer whale.  
Red herring fallacies5 Four types of red herring fallacies are listed below. 
• Appeal to 
emotion 
• Reference to the negative emotional experiences of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (p. 16), learned helplessness (p. 18), and other psychological 
concerns of humans without documentation on the affective states of 
killer whales is misleading and lacks valid reasoning. 
• Appeal to 
consequences6 
• Mention of rare killer whale attacks on caretakers (p. 10) rather than 
acknowledgement of human-killer whale bonds or link to animal 
welfare consequences.  
• Appeal to 
nature7 
• Marino et al. argued that killer whales must be suffering from 
maladaptive stress responses (p. 13) due to the absence of opportunities 
for extensive travel, rather than considering the elements of why killer 
whale travel (e.g., to forage) and how relevant animal needs could be 
addressed under human care. 
• Association 
fallacy8 
• Correlating Carnivora and killer whale behavior (p. 16) because both 
consume other animals, rather than accounting for different 
environmental and other factors.  
Note. 1Selection of individual cases or data that support a position while ignoring a larger body of evidence that contradicts the 
position 
2Vividly detailed descriptions that are intended to convince that a problem exists while appealing to emotion 
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3Overhelming readers with large quantities of true but marginally relevant information that looks impressive but is not fully 
understood 
4Where readers are provided “shocking evidence” and encouraged to make their own conclusions without the expectation that readers 
will take the time to reason through the argument  
5A strategy of distracting readers from a concept by presenting a different argument that is easier to address. There are different types 
of red herrings, such as those identified. 
6Use of positive or negative outcomes in support of an assertion that distracts from the main point 
7Judgement is based solely on whether something is considered natural or unnatural  
8Arguing that shared characteristics imply general similarities 
 
Conclusion 
  
 We document an extensive number of misrepresentations that undermine Marino et al.’s (2019) beliefs 
regarding killer whale welfare under human care. These misrepresentations are not differences of scientific 
opinion and instead represent misleading talking points in support of what appear to be philosophical beliefs 
that are not explicitly discussed. Marino et al.’s use of these illusory approaches undermines the credibility of 
every one of their points regarding killer whale needs, animal welfare, and affective states. Their biased 
representations are also obstacles to objective consideration of how to best care for killer whales. In addition, 
this approach does not contribute to the development of strategies for improving animal welfare or advancing 
established principles. Importantly, failure to use objective and candid assessments of available data markedly 
contrasts with the scientific ethical standards expected of credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018). 
These deviations from scientific norms are characteristic of common, nonscientific literature that is available 
to the general public rather than a rigorous contribution to the scientific peer-reviewed literature. 
 
We would also like to mention that manuscripts such as Marino et al.’s (2019) do great damage to the 
fields of comparative psychology and to behavioral science as a whole. Recently, an international effort 
attempted to replicate some of the more well-known findings in social and cognitive psychology and could 
only replicate 30% and 50%, respectively (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This problem of replication of 
previous studies is illustrative of what we consider a serious and growing issue in not only the behavioral 
sciences but of science more generally with respect to the acceptance and publication of sloppy work with 
subjective interpretation that leads to faulty science. The usage of the Marino et al. publication can impair the 
sharing of dependable research and create misinformation in the field of killer whales in human care. 
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